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The  ‘paradoxes  of  coincidence’  are  generally  taken  as  an  important  factor  for deciding between rival views on persistence through time. In particular, the ability to deal with apparent cases of temporary coincidence is usually regarded as a good reason for favouring perdurantism (or ‘four-dimensionalism’) over endurantism (or ‘three-dimensionalism’).  However,  the  recent  work  of  C.  Gilmore  (2007)  and  M. McGrath (2007) challenges this standard view. For different reasons, both Gilmore and McGrath conclude that perdurantism does not really obtain support from the puzzles of temporary coincidence. In this paper, I will evaluate their arguments and defend the opposite view: that the paradoxes of coincidence do give some support to perdurantism. However, the way in which they do so is rather unexpected. As we will see,  there  are  different  ways  in  which  coincidence  scenarios  may  be  thought  to support perdurantism, some of which have not been yet sufficiently explored. Thus, my immediate goal is to explore one of those directions, bringing into focus a new 
1 I  would  like  to  thank Marta  Campdelacreu,  Joan Pagès,  David  Pineda,  and two  anonymous  referees  from 
Philosophia for their helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. Research leading to this work has been  partially  funded  by  the  projects  CSD2009-00056,  FFI2010-15717,  and  HUM2007-61108  (Spanish Government).
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argument from coincidence to perdurantism. And although I motivate my discussion by examining the arguments in the work of Gilmore and McGrath, the merits of this argument can be independently assessed. More generally, my overall purpose is to contribute  to  our  general  understanding  of  how  the  topics  of  coincidence  and persistence bear on each other. 
I will proceed as follows: in section 1, I briefly describe one of the puzzles and the  typical way in which perdurantists react to it. In section 2, I inspect more closely the  debate on persistence,  identifying two different issues  that  are at stake between endurantism and perdurantism. Next, I discuss Gilmore’s argument, pointing out a dialectical move whereby perdurantists can resist it. This will take us to McGrath,  whose central argument blocks that dialectical move. Finally, in section 3, I argue that  even  granting  Gilmore  and  McGrath  their  criticisms  of  the  perdurantist argument  they  consider,  there  is  a  second,  independent  coincidence-based consideration  favouring  perdurantism  that  they  do  not  address.  I  spell  out  this consideration in some detail and conclude that cases of temporary coincidence still  provide good reasons for preferring perdurantism over endurantism. 
1. Gilmore: ‘old’ and ‘new’ puzzles of coincidence.
Ordinary  objects  persist  through  time  –  i.e.,  they  exist  at  different  times. Endurantism and perdurantism are  usually  presented  as alternative  views about 
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how exactly this happens, i.e. as answers to the question of how objects persist.  For instance,  Gilmore  characterizes  perdurantism  as  the  view  that  material  objects persist by ‘being temporally extended and having different temporal parts located at different times’, and endurantism as the view that objects persist ‘by being  wholly  
present at  each  moment  of  their  careers’.2 This  is  a  very  common  way  of characterizing  the  endurantism-perdurantism  debate,  which  I  will  provisionally adopt in this section. 
It is also a common view that the debate between perdurantism and endurantism is  in part to be decided by considering how well the views deal with the ‘puzzles of coincidence’. Following Gilmore, let us say that a coincidence puzzle is an ‘apparent counterexample to following, widely accepted anti-coincidence principle: 
[AC] It is impossible for numerically distinct material objects to coincide – i.e., to be […] wholly present in exactly the same location […]’. (p. 177-8)
By ‘being wholly present’ Gilmore means a relation of location partially elucidated by the following principle:  necessarily,  if  object  O is  wholly  present at spacetime region R, then O has, at  R, the same shape and size as R, and O stands, at  R, in the same  spatiotemporal  relations  to  things  as  does  R.3 Given  this  set-up,  solving  a 
2 Gilmore (2007),  p.  177. In what follows, all  page references correspond to this article,  unless otherwise stated.
3 The proper understanding of the locution ‘being wholly present at R’ has been the object of much  recent  discussion,  especially  in  the  context  of  the  proper  characterization  of endurantism. But Gilmore uses the locution in a relatively unproblematic way, as equivalent to ‘being exactly located at R’ or ‘being an exact occupant of R’ – all of them understood as 
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coincidence puzzle consists in showing that the case in question does not constitute a genuine counterexample to the principle (AC). 
I  will  argue  later  that  we  should  revise  this  understanding  of  the  debate  on persistence, and also the idea that the puzzles of coincidence arise from an apparent  conflict  with  the  anti-coincidence  principle  (AC).  But  let  us  provisionally  follow Gilmore  in  thinking  of  the  puzzles  in  this  way.  Gilmore  points  out,  as  is  also commonly assumed, that the ‘old puzzles’  of coincidence may be grouped in two sorts:  (A) those apparently involving objects that coincide during only part of their careers (i.e., cases of temporary coincidence);  (B) those apparently involving objects that coincide throughout their careers (i.e.,  cases of  permanent coincidence). It is puzzles of type A that are generally thought to be relevant for the choice between endurantism  and  perdurantism.  Puzzles  of  type  B  are  regarded  as  equally problematic for endurantists and perdurantists and hence as irrelevant for deciding between the two views. Puzzles of type A, on the other hand, are generally regarded as  especially  problematic  for  endurantism  and  not  for  perdurantism,  which constitutes a reason for preferring the latter. In Gilmore’s terms, ‘puzzles of the first type (involving temporary spatial co-location) can be solved simply by abandoning endurantism in favour of perdurantism’ (p. 178). To see why this is so, let us briefly recall a puzzle case of type A: 
indicated in the text. I will follow Gilmore in using these three locutions interchangeably. I will also follow his use of the term ‘coincidence’ as defined by (AC). It should be noticed that Gilmore’s unabridged statement of (AC) also requires that entities be composed of the same matter at  t in order to count as coincident at  t.  I omit this second requirement, which as Gilmore himself notes, is irrelevant to his arguments, and also to mine. 
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A case of type A: the statue and the clay.At time t1, an artist buys a piece of clay and moulds it into a statue, which is finished at t2. The statue did not exist at t1 (it was created later), and the piece of clay exists at 
t2 (it was not destroyed by the creation of the statue). It follows by Leibniz’s Law that the statue and the clay are distinct objects. But then we seem to have two coincident objects at t2. 
In order to see how this puzzle can be solved ‘simply by abandoning endurantism in favour of  perdurantism’,  consider  first  what endurantists  say about  the case: the statue and the clay are three-dimensional objects, each of them wholly present at many different spatiotemporal regions. But the spatial  region they occupy at  t2 is exactly the same. They are thus wholly present at exactly the same spatiotemporal  region, thereby falsifying the anti-coincidence principle. Things appear differently to perdurantists: if perdurantism is true, the statue and the clay are four-dimensional objects,  each  of  them  wholly  present  only  at  the  four-dimensional  region corresponding  to  its  career.  There  is  no  single  region at  which  both  are  wholly  present  and  therefore  they  do  not  coincide  in  the  sense  precluded  by  the  anti-coincidence principle. This is why, as Gilmore puts it, the adoption of perdurantism over endurantism is by itself a solution to puzzles of type A. Since this argument for perdurantism is based on the principle (AC), I will refer to it as the ‘AC-argument for  perdurantism’.  Gilmore's  main purpose in  the  paper I  am discussing  is  to balance the  score  by 
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presenting a set of ‘new puzzles’ – a third type of coincidence puzzle that does just  the opposite of what the ‘old’ puzzles of type A do. In the same way as puzzles of type A constitute a reason for preferring perdurantism over endurantism, Gilmore’s new  cases  are  supposed  to  provide  a  reason  for  preferring  endurantism  over perdurantism. I  will  describe one of his new puzzles in a moment.  Before that,  I would like mention a cause of concern about the AC-argument for perdurantism that I have just presented following Gilmore. I do not regard this cause of concern as a full-fledged  objection  to  Gilmore’s  general  argument,  but  as  an  indicator  that something is not right with it.  
The observation is this:  in Gilmore’s AC-argument no role at all  is  played by the  notion  of  temporal  part.  This  is  surprising.  One  might  have  thought  that  the fundamental disagreement between endurantists and perdurantists was precisely on whether objects have proper temporal parts, and therefore that an argument for perdurantism would have to consist precisely in showing that temporal parts are needed  for  some  reason  or  other.  Not  so  in  Gilmore’s  presentation.  In  his  AC-argument,  the  perdurantist’s  advantage  comes  from  her  view  about  what  the 
locations of the statue and the clay really are – it  is  this view that allows her to maintain the principle (AC).  This  contrasts  with the way in  which self-described perdurantists think of the argument from coincidence. Consider what I take to be a typical perdurantist speech about our case of the statue and the clay: 
The statue and the clay are no more mysterious than two overlapping roads. 
6
Just as overlapping roads may occupy the same region in virtue of sharing a segment, the statue and the clay can occupy the same place at  t2 in virtue of sharing their  t2-temporal part. It is because they share this temporal part that they do not crowd each other out.
In this speech, no advantage is claimed from the fact that there is a sense (the one relevant  for  the  anti-coincidence  principle)  in  which  the  statue  and  clay  do not  coincide.  Instead,  the  notion  of  temporal  part plays  a  crucial  role.  This  strongly suggests  that  the  AC-argument  fails  to  capture  something  important  about  how perdurantists think that cases of coincidence support their view. This is most clear if  we focus on the metaphor of overcrowding that perdurantists typically use. Here it is clearly the existence of a shared temporal part that is thought to prevent the clay  and the statue from ‘crowding each other out’. That is to say, it is a shared temporal  part that makes it possible for the two objects to fit together in the same region. Moreover, consider the following thought: if we are worried about how the statue and the clay can fit together in a single region, then it is of no help to be told that the  region in  question is  only  a proper  sub-region of the  one that  the objects  really occupy. (Analogously, if we are worried about how a 1 m3 box can contain two solid objects of apparently 1 m3 each, it is of no help to be told that one of the objects 
really measures 1.5 m3 and that it is partially outside the box). But this is precisely what  happens  in  Gilmore’s  AC-argument:  the  perdurantist  solution  to  the  ‘old puzzles’  consists merely in noting that the statue and the clay are in fact exactly  located at different regions – one of which is a proper sub-region of the other. Thus,  
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as long as the metaphor of overcrowding – and the rest of the perdurantist speech – is representative of how perdurantists think that the puzzles of coincidence support their view, we should conclude that the AC-argument is leaving something out. 
I will discuss how this observation affects Gilmore’s overall argument in the next section. Before that let us briefly present one of Gilmore’s ‘new puzzles’: 
A case of type C: Tubman and Cell.A cell (called ‘Cell’) is created at the beginning of year 2000 and continues to exist until the end of 2002. At that point, Cell travels backward in time until the time of its  creation and again continues to exist until the end of 2002. This process is repeated numerous times, always in such a way that Cell never progresses beyond the end of  2002. Cell never leaves the vicinity of a bathtub and its trips in time are numerous  enough and structured in such a way that at the end of its career, Cell composes something with the appearance of a conscious human being lying in the bathtub during the three years. Let us call it ‘Tubman’. Cell and Tubman seem to be different objects: the former travels in time, the latter does not. 
As we mentioned, puzzles of type C are intended to compensate for the effect that puzzles of type A have in the endurance–perdurance debate. Gilmore argues that if  perdurantism is true, Cell and Tubman exactly occupy the same four-dimensional region and thus violate the anti-coincidence principle.4 If endurantism is true, on the 
4 For discussion of this diagnosis, see Eagle (2010).
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other hand, Cell and Tubman have different locations: Cell is located at many three-dimensional cell-shaped regions, and Tubman at many human-shaped regions. Thus, no  single  region  is  exactly  occupied  by  both  Cell  and  Tubman,  and  the  anti-coincidence principle is therefore preserved. Gilmore concludes that puzzles of type C can be solved simply by shifting from perdurantism to endurantism. As a result,  the  perdurantist  attempt  to  support  her  view  on  cases  of  coincidence  is unsuccessful,  since the endurantist  can reply with a symmetric argument for her view. The puzzles of coincidence are thus irrelevant for making a choice between endurantism and perdurantism.
As suggested above, it is questionable whether Gilmore’s construal of the argument from the ‘old puzzles’ (the AC-argument) really captures the perdurantist’s insight about coincidence. As a result, it is also questionable that a symmetrical argument for endurance will affect the dialectic in the proposed way. I will discuss this issue in  the next two sections. But since my main goal is to offer a more detailed picture of how the puzzles of coincidence relate to the endurance-perdurance debate, it will be helpful to start by clarifying what this debate involves.  
2. A closer look at the debate on persistence.
I have been assuming that endurantism and perdurantism are competing answers to the question: how do ordinary objects persist through time? But so framed, the debate 
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conflates  two  arguably  different  issues,  one  about  location  and  the  other  about temporal parts: 
(i) What kind of regions are occupied by ordinary persisting objects?
(ii) Do ordinary persisting objects have proper temporal parts? 5
Two important answers to (i) are what I will call  topological endurantism (TE) and 
topological perdurantism (TP). According to  TE, ordinary persisting objects exactly occupy many different regions that are spatially but not temporally extended (these regions are thus ‘three-dimensional’). According to TP, on the other hand, ordinary objects exactly occupy just one four-dimensional region – a region that is temporally  as well as spatially extended. There are also two salient views regarding question (ii), which I call mereological endurantism (ME) and mereological perdurantism (MP). According  to  ME,  ordinary  persisting  objects  have  no  proper  temporal  parts.6 According  to  MP,  on the  other  hand,  an ordinary persisting  object  has  a  proper temporal part  at each of the times included in its lifespan.  Questions (i) and (ii)  cross-cut each other, and their different answers can be combined in more than one way. In particular, it seems prima facie possible to combine TP with ME: on this view, persisting objects exactly occupy a temporally extended region  R but lack proper 
5 The  distinction  between  these  two  questions  and  the  different  views  that  emerge  as answers to them are relatively familiar. With different terminological choices, the distinction is drawn by Gilmore (2006, 2008), McGrath (2007), and Parsons (2007), among others. 6 Object x is a temporal part of y at t iff (i) x is part of y; (ii) x is located at, but only at, t; and (iii) x overlaps every part of y that is located at t. Cf. Sider (2001), p. 59.
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temporal parts corresponding to the spatially maximal sub-regions of R. 
Let us now re-consider the ‘old puzzles’ of coincidence. Gilmore’s AC-argument for perdurantism  is  in  fact  an  argument  for  topological perdurantism  and  against 
topological endurantism. As a result, the argument does not preclude the view that results from combining TP with  ME. In the same way, the argument from the ‘new puzzles’ targets  TP, not  MP. The principle AC that generates Gilmore’s puzzles (old and new) imposes constraints on what kind of locations objects can and cannot have, and tells  us  nothing on which  parts they must  or must not have.  As  we already noticed,  this  construal  fails  to  take  into  account  the  thought,  attested  by  the 
perdurantist speech considered above, that cases of temporary coincidence directly support existence of temporal parts. That is to say, the perdurantist speech speaks directly in favour of mereological perdurantism.
However, in order to evaluate Gilmore’s general argument, let us focus on only one kind of opponent: those who hold  both TP and MP (let’s call this package of views ‘classical  perdurantism’).  Focusing  on  classical  perdurantism  in  this  way  is charitable to Gilmore (who actually describes his opponent as someone holding both 
TE and MP) and important in its own right (since most self-described perdurantists are indeed classical perdurantists). How good is Gilmore’s argument from the ‘new puzzles’ against classical perdurantism? Our discussion so far suggests that there is a way out for the classical perdurantist: she may well avoid Gilmore’s challenge by 
denying the  anti-coincidence  principle.  This  looks  now  as  a  live  option  for  the 
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classical  perdurantist  because,  as  we  have seen above,  her  ‘perdurantist  speech’ does not really commit her to the anti-coincidence principle.
Let us reflect on this a bit further. Why should the classical perdurantist accept the anti-coincidence  principle?  One  natural  answer  would  be:  because  there  are compelling reasons for believing it is true. (We will consider some such reasons in a moment).  But  surprisingly,  this  is  not  Gilmore’s  answer  –  indeed,  he  does  not  mention any reason why the anti-coincidence principle is so ‘widely accepted’. His answer  is,  instead,  that  perdurantists  are  dialectically  committed  to  the  anti-coincidence  principle:  they  cannot  reject  it  because  they  use  it  in  arguing  from temporary coincidence for their view (and against endurantism). (p. 190). But do they? The anti-coincidence principle certainly plays a role in the AC-argument for perdurantism. But as we have already noticed,  the AC-argument is  not what one typically  finds  in  perdurantist  speech  about  cases  of  temporary  coincidence.  In particular, that speech does not appeal to the anti-coincidence principle and does not take pride in avoiding coincidence in the sense precluded by it. So as far as the  
perdurantist speech is concerned, there is nothing dialectically inappropriate in the classical  perdurantist’s  denial  of  the  anti-coincidence  principle.  The  classical perdurantist may well be committed to it for independent reasons, but not in virtue of her perdurantist speech about cases of type A. 
Thus,  if Gilmore is to achieve his overall goal (i.e.  to present a coincidence-based argument for endurantism and against perdurantism), we need positive reasons to 
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believe the anti-coincidence principle. These reasons can be found in what is often called  the  ‘supervenience  argument’  or  ‘grounding  argument’  against  coincident entities – a detailed version of which is powerfully advanced by McGrath (2007).  Very  roughly,  and  far  from  doing  full  justice  to  McGrath’s  careful  defence,  the argument is this. First, notice that if there were coincident entities (like the statue and the clay from our case A under the assumption of  TE), they would be alike in many important respects: they would be composed of the same parts, they would have the same shape, the same spatiotemporal relations to other objects, etc. Now, McGrath argues for the truth of a  supervenience principle according to which it is impossible for two objects to be alike in these ‘basic’ respects while differing in their historical and futural properties. If the arguments for this supervenience principle  are sound, then it is impossible that the statue and the clay coincide at t2 and, more generally, the anti-coincidence principle must be true. 
Thus,  the  supervenience  argument  is  a  positive  reason for  ruling  out  coincident entities.  If the perdurantist accepts it, as she must if the argument is sound, then she may  advance the  AC-argument  against  endurantism.  But  then she also  faces  the challenge from Gilmore’s ‘new puzzles’.  Moreover,  the supervenience argument is independently  problematic  for  perdurantists  and in  a  much more direct  way,  as McGrath  rightly  emphasizes.  The  supervenience  principle  rules  out  not  only coinciding  three-dimensional  objects  (thus  generating  trouble  for  topological endurantists), but also partially overlapping perduring objects. If the supervenience principle is true, it is of no help that the statue and the clay share a temporal part at 
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t2.  The two objects are nevertheless alike in the relevant basic respects at  t2 and therefore  they  must  be  also  alike  in  their  historical  properties.  That  is  to  say, although the perduring statue and the perduring clay do not coincide in our sense (because  they  exactly  occupy  different  regions),  they  are  an  apparent counterexample  to  the  supervenience  principle:  they  are  alike  in  the  relevant respects at t2 while differing in how they were at t1. As McGrath points out, insisting on  the  “familiar  mantra  ‘partial  overlap  is  not  coincidence’”  is  of  no  help.  Such insistence merely amounts to rejecting the supervenience principle as false, without offering  any  illuminating  reason  why  it  is  false.  (p.  164).  Thus,  McGrath’s  main conclusion is that the puzzles of coincidence are ‘every bit as challenging’ for both endurantists  and  perdurantists.  (p.  143).  So  like  Gilmore,  McGrath  rejects  the widespread view that these puzzles provide some reason to prefer perdurantism over endurantism. 
There are of course reasons for being sceptical about the supervenience argument. 7 In what follows, however, I will just grant that it is successful and therefore a good reason  for  believing  Gilmore’s  anti-coincidence  principle.  I  will  also  grant  that,  supplemented with the supervenience argument as a positive reason for holding the anti-coincidence  principle,  Gilmore’s  attempt  to  alter  the  endurance-perdurance score may well succeed. But what I will argue for instead is that there is a different argument from coincidence to perdurantism, one that does not depend at all on the anti-coincidence principle. Furthermore, this alternative argument is, unlike the AC-
7 See for instance Sider (2007).
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argument, completely aligned with the perdurantist speech in taking the existence of proper temporal parts (rather than absence of co-location) as the key feature of the perdurantist description of the cases.
3. The argument from ‘the monist intuition’.
Let’s grant McGrath and Gilmore most of what they argue for. Let’s grant McGrath that the supervenience principle is  true,  and that this  makes cases of temporary coincidence  equally  troubling for  perdurantists  and endurantists.  And let’s  grant Gilmore that  the perdurantist  is  committed to the anti-coincidence principle  and therefore faces the challenge from type-C scenarios. What I want to argue in this section is that, having granted all this, the perdurantist is still in a better position than the endurantist when it comes to dealing with temporary coincidence. There is a different argument, not based on supervenience-based considerations, that goes from temporary coincidence to perdurantism. 
The argument in question hinges on what I call ‘the monist intuition’ that many of us have about cases of  type A.  We have the feeling,  when confronted with cases of temporary coincidence,  that the Leibniz Law argument is somehow illegitimately multiplying the number of entities. The monist intuition tells us that at  t2 there is just one statue-shaped object before us – not two. This intuition directly concerns number and identity: it is an intuition about how many statue-shaped objects we are 
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confronted with. Of course, that we have this monist intuition is compatible with feeling the pull of the Leibniz Law argument for distinctness. Like other puzzles in philosophy, the puzzles of coincidence arise from conflicting intuitions: the monist intuition on the one hand, and the ‘pluralist’ intuition exploited by the Leibniz Law argument on the other.  
Although I think it obvious that we have the monist intuition, let me insist on this  point.  One way of noting that we have this intuition (and how strong it  is) is  by considering  the  theory  that  most  directly  relies  on  it:  the  ‘temporary  identity’ account of the puzzles. This theory is initially attractive because it allows us to say straightforwardly  what our monist  intuition dictates:  that  at  t2 there  is  only one statue-shaped object before us, and therefore that the statue just is the clay (one and the same object) even if at  t1 the statue and clay are different. And this is, I think, precisely what we are initially inclined to say about the case, even if we eventually refrain from saying it. That is to say, even if we are not in the end prepared to adopt  the temporary identity view, it seems that, as Sider puts it, ‘there is something very right’ about this view.8 What seems right, to me at least, is that it clearly preserves the monist intuition that at t2, there is only one statue-shaped object before us – not two. If we didn’t have this intuition, the temporary identity view would not be even initially attractive. But it is. 
Now,  what  seems  right  about  the  temporary  identity  view  is  also  captured  by 
8 Sider (2001), p. 166. 
16
classical perdurantism, in a way that does not require us to go all the way with the  temporary identity theorist. And this is of course the point of the coincidence-based argument for perdurantism that I want to highlight in this section. According to the perdurantist, both the statue and the clay are present before us at t2. So at t2 we are confronted  with  at  least  two  statue-shaped  objects.  But  given  the  classical perdurantist picture, and in contrast to what happens if endurantism is true, we can also make sense of the monist intuition: there is an important sense in which it is true that there is just one statue-shaped object before us at t2. This is the right thing to say if we restrict our attention to the things that are exactly located at t2 – that is, at the relevant t2-, three-dimensional region. If classical perdurantism is true, there is just one statue-shaped thing that is exactly located at that region: the temporal part  shared  by the  statue  and  clay.  This  is  not  so  if  endurantism  (in  any  of  its varieties considered above) is true. First, if  TE is true,  both the statue and the clay are exactly located at t2. Second, if the package ME+TP is true instead, no object at all is exactly located at  t2.  Both the statue and the clay are located at different four-dimensional regions. Notice that it is the postulation of a single shared temporal part that gives classical perdurantism an advantage over endurantism in capturing the monist intuition. And it is because of this ability to capture the monist intuition that  classical perdurantism receives support from the puzzles of coincidence. 
The argument that I have just presented on behalf of classical perdurantists is based on the observation that they,  unlike endurantists,  acknowledge the existence of a kind of things such that, if we restrict our attention to them, it is true that at t2 there 
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is only one statue-shaped object before us. It should be noticed, though, that this is an unusual way of restricting our attention. Classical perdurantists typically think that  ordinary  speakers  normally  restrict  their  domains  of  quantification  to 
perduring objects  –things  that  are  statues  and  lumps  of  clay,  and  not  merely instantaneous  temporal  parts  thereof.9  So  in  the  usual way  of  restricting  our quantifiers, it is not true that at t2 there is only one statue-shaped object before us. In order to render this claim true, the perdurantist is forced to offer a peculiar, non-standard  interpretation  of  it.  Moreover,  the  unusual restriction  to  which perdurantists need to appeal is one that seems to require competence with concepts that do not belong to the ordinary speaker’s repertoire,  like the concept of being exactly located at a three-dimensional instantaneous region. Therefore, although it is perfectly  admissible  for  the  perdurantist  in  the  philosophy  room  to  restrict  her attention to whatever objects she finds convenient, it is hard to see how ordinary speakers can restrict their attention in the required way. But then it is doubtful that  existence of a temporal part  exactly  located at the  t2-three dimensional region is relevant for explaining the intuition that there is only one statue shaped thing before us.
I  agree that  the argument from the monist intuition requires the perdurantist  to 
9 Stage theorists disagree with perdurantists about this. Stage theorists think that ordinary speakers  normally  restrict  their  quantifiers  to  things  that  are  exactly  located  at  three-dimensional instantaneous regions, and that it is those things that are statues and lumps of clay.  So  stage  theorists  do  not  face  the  difficulty  discussed  in  this  paragraph  and  are therefore the party most directly benefited by the argument from the monist intuition. As I am about to point out, I think classical perdurantists do also benefit from the argument. But  if I were wrong about this, the upshot would be that these coincidence-based considerations favour stage theory over classical perdurantism and endurantism. 
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postulate an unusual restriction in the domain of ordinary quantifiers. But I deny that this restriction requires competence with philosophical concepts, and that it is therefore  unavailable to ordinary speakers.  This  denial  is  plausible given certain metaphysical and meta-semantic assumptions that I will now make explicit. The first assumption  is  that  instantaneous  temporal  parts  of  material  objects  enjoy  a particular metaphysical status: they constitute a highly natural kind of things, even if  not a  perfectly natural one.10 They are very much alike not only in their temporal extent  (which  is  part  of  their  intrinsic  nature),  but  also  in  that  they  exemplify relatively  fundamental  properties.  In  fact,  instantaneous  temporal  parts  may  be regarded as the ‘basic constituents’ of the world, the properties of which constitute the minimal supervenience base on which everything else supervenes.  Of course,  perdurantists are not as such committed to this metaphysical picture, but it is not an unnatural one for them to have. The second assumption, the meta-semantic one, is  that naturalness matters for interpretation. Lewis (1984) famously defends the idea that natural properties  are ‘easier to be meant’  than non-natural ones: the more natural  a  property  is,  the  more  intrinsically  eligible  it  is  as  the  meaning  of  a predicate.  Lewis’  idea easily  extends to  domains  of  reference and quantification:  things that exemplify highly natural properties are also highly eligible as objects of singular reference,  and constitute highly eligible domains of quantification. In the same sense in which greeness is ‘easier to be meant’ than grueness, a more natural set of things is intrinsically more eligible than a gerrymandered one to be a domain of  ordinary quantification.  Thus,  with the metaphysical  assumption in place,  this 
10 See Lewis (1983) for the idea of naturalness employed here.   
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meta-sematic view implies that there is a reason (albeit not always a decisive one) to understand ordinary quantifiers as restricted to instantaneous things. And in some circumstances,  when there is no conflict with other constraints in interpretation, this  reason may be decisive.  The important thing to notice here is  that  ordinary speakers  do  not  need to  do anything  special  to  have their  quantifiers  restricted according to the  naturalness  constraint,  just  as  they do not have to do anything special  to  mean  greeness rather  than  grueness.  In  particular,  they  need  not  be competent  with  the  philosophical  concepts  that  would  be  required  to  make  the restriction  explicit.  Therefore,  the  unusual  kind  of  quantifier  domain  restriction required by the argument from the monist intuition is one that ordinary speakers 
can make, and it is not implausible to understand them as making it in particular cases, as when they claim that there is only one statue-shaped object before us.
In sum, the postulation of temporal parts enables the perdurantist to vindicate the monist intuition about the case of the statue and the clay. And this is why the cases  of  temporary  coincidence  constitute  a  reason  for  preferring  perdurantism  over endurantism.  It  may  be  interesting  to  compare  this  ‘argument  from  the  monist intuition’ with the AC-argument discussed by Gilmore. The outstanding difference is  that  the  present  argument  supports  perdurantism  in  virtue  of  supporting  the  existence of temporal parts (it is the existence of a proper temporal part shared by  the statue and the clay that accounts for the monist intuition about the case). The AC-argument, as we saw, makes no appeal to temporal parts. It is true, as Gilmore  emphasizes, that for the perdurantist there is no single region at which both the 
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statue and the clay are wholly present, and that this is a difference with respect to the  endurantist  description  of  the  case.  But  this  is  not  the  moving  cog  of  the  argument that I am presenting. The feature of the perdurantist description of the case that is relevant for the present argument is not that the statue and the clay  exactly occupy different four-dimensional regions, but rather that there is a  third 
thing that  is  the  only  statue-shaped  thing  exactly  occupying  the  relevant  three-dimensional  t2-region.  Supra-regions  of  this  t2-region  (and  what  objects  occupy them) are completely irrelevant to the argument from the monist intuition. 
It is worth emphasizing that the argument from the monist intuition exploits the specific ontological thesis that classical perdurantists hold against their opponents: the thesis that there exist at  t2 an instantaneous temporal part that the statue and the lump share. Because of this, it is prima facie unlikely that endurantists will have at their disposal a relatively parallel strategy to accommodate the monist intuition.  As we have seen above, the basic complaint of Gilmore and McGrath was that once we are clear on what perdurantists say about coincidence scenarios, it is less clear that endurantists cannot say something analogous. But even if this is true about the AC-argument  and  other  coincidence-based  considerations  for  perdurantism,  it seems  that  the  argument  from the  monist  intuition  cannot  be  replicated  by  the endurantist, given her rejection of instantaneous temporal parts.11 
11 Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging me to make this point fully explicit. The rough characterization  provided  in  this  paragraph  for  Gilmore’s  and  McGrath’s  argumentative strategy applies also to Wasserman (2002) p. 209. 
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Of  course  there  are  other, very  different  sorts  of  moves  that  endurantists  can attempt  in  order  to  capture  the  monist  intuition  themselves.  One  of  them  has already  been mentioned:  an endurantist  can  adopt  the  temporary identity  view.  Other such moves consist in denying that the clay survives re-shaping  (as in Burke’s  dominance account), or denying that something is created through re-shaping (as some strong version of mereological essentialism may have it). All these moves are open, and their merits and costs have to be assessed and compared with those of  adopting perdurantism. My interest  here  is  not in  adjudicating perdurantism the victory in this cost-benefit analysis, but merely in clarifying what its benefits are.
Let us summarize the dialectics. We started in section 1 by considering an argument from  coincidence  to  perdurantism  in  which  the  anti-coincidence  principle  AC featured a crucial  premise – the AC-argument.  But as we saw, Gilmore offers an analogous argument, which also has AC as a crucial premise, from coincidence to 
endurantism – the argument from the ‘new puzzles’. I mentioned in section 2 that perdurantists could react to this second argument by  denying the anti-coincidence principle. Doing so will certainly forestall the AC-argument for perdurantism. But we can  now  see  that  even  in  this  case  the  score  would  not  be  0-0:  even  if  the  perdurantist  loses  the AC-argument  for her  view,  she still  has up her  sleeve the argument  from  the  monist  intuition  that  I  presented  in  this  section.  Suppose, however,  that  the  perdurantist  accepts the  anti-coincidence  principle,  perhaps because she is  convinced by the supervenience argument presented by McGrath. Then the two symmetric arguments considered by Gilmore are restored, levelling 
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the score at 1-1. But in this case, the argument from the monist intuition considered in  this  section  is  an  additional  and  independent  argument  from  temporary coincidence to perdurantism. The final score is then 2-1 in favour of perdurantism. It  is therefore not true that, as both Gilmore and McGrath claim, cases of temporary coincidence provide no reason for preferring perdurantism over endurantism.
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